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Introduction
European population ecological studies of interest organizations are rare. The concern about the Schattschneiderian upper-class accent motivating such studies in the US (e.g. Salisbury 1984) never gained much traction in European, 'organized' interest systems. There have been, however, several large-n studies that seek to describe or explain the numbers and types of interest organizations. These have come under several theoretical headings that have some affiliation with 'population ecological' interests, such as resource dependency or complex associations theory. Such studies tend to have a focus on a specific sector or organizational type, such as social movement organizations or business interest associations rather than a system-level, behavioral focus on what Jordan et al (2004) label 'pressure participants'. Only very recently, scholars in several European countries have initiated system-wide, population ecological studies (e.g. Halpin& Jordan 2011b, Messer, Berkhout & Lowery 2010) or have started data collection on such populations of interest organizations (e.g. Fisker 2013 , Klüver 2012 , Naurin& Borang 2012 . In this review I assess the longer running research traditions of large-n studies, recently published ecological studies and some projects that are still on-going. I compare these studies on their implicit or explicit assumptions about the 'competitive environment' of the organizations studied and how these assumptions are included in the research design. The selective (or competitive) environment or 'fundamental niche' is the multidimensional space where organizations compete for resources and which, eventually, determines whether an organization or certain organizational (political) activities survive. It is conceptually and empirically very difficult to simultaneously study multiple competitive dimensions. Researchers have to prioritize some dimensions over the others. The dimension that is deemed most important is used to select cases and these cases are classified along other dimensions of interest. The main distinction in the literature is between, on the one hand, researchers who assume that interest organizations of a certain type such as social movement organizations or business interest associations compete for organizational resources, and, on the other hand, researchers who assume that interest organizations active on a certain topic, policy field or economic sector compete for organizational resources.
In the following literature review I first discuss the studies that focus on a certain organizational type and then review studies that use some sort of institutionally demarcated set of organizations. Please note that this structuring of the field complexly relates to several other conceptual divisions of the field. Most importantly, this is the differentiation of researchers focusing on behaviorally defined 'pressure participants' in general (including 'institutions' such as schools, companies or municipalities) and those who focus on a specific structural organizational form of collective action such as business interest associations (Halpin& Jordan 2009 , Halpin& Jordan 2011a . The research field is further fragmented between those who conceptually prioritize 'bottom-up' (or supply) explanations in the constitution of interest populations and researchers whose key interest is in 'top-down' (or demand) explanations. These interests directly affect the selection and classification of interest organizations.
The review concludes with an assessment of specific empirical and theoretical challenges in various strands in the literature, opportunities for fruitful comparisons of research findings of different projects and venues for further research.
Counting organizations per type
In the following I discuss studies which have selected cases on the basis of organizational type. In the second section, I focus on studies that use some sort of classification scheme in order to differentiate relevant competitive environments within more general populations consisting of various types of organizations. The latter part of the review is per country. Three organizational-type traditions are discussed in this section. These are the quantitative approaches in studies of non-profit or voluntary organizations (e.g. in the tradition of Salamon and Anheier, 1998; Clifford et al 2013) , business interest associations (e.g. van Waarden, 1992) and social movement organizations (Olzak and Uhrig, 2001) In selecting studies for inclusion in this review, I have been relatively flexible as regards the precise theoretical perspective used. Some of the studies mentioned do not fall within the population ecological approach but engage in similar mapping exercises. Others take an organizational rather than population ecological approach in the tradition of Hannan and Freeman (1989) and Hannan and Carroll (1992) , with a dual focus on organizational and population level factors. It should be noted that more or less all of the studies are designed in such a way that the organizations included rely on similar resources, and consequently share their selective environment. This usually requires the selection of organizations focusing on a certain cause (e.g. women's rights), working in a certain geographic area (e.g. neighborhoods) or bringing together certain groups of people in society (e.g. workers).
First, there is a cross-national research community with the aim of counting the numbers and various attributes of non-profit or voluntary associations, in Salamon and Anheiers words (1998, 216) 'the scope and structure of nonprofit activity'. The network is centred around the John Hopkins University Center for Civil Society Studies (ccss.jhu.edu). This tradition relies on a 'structural/operational' definition of non-profit organizations as formal, private, nonprofit distributing, self-governing and voluntary organizations (Salamon& Anheier 1992 ). The precise cut-off point on each of these dimensions is, in some ways, arbitrary (Anheier 2004 ). Furthermore, the structural rather than behavioral nature of the definition fits only a limited range of theories and produces some peculiar comparative research outcomes. For instance, structural definition of non-profits leads to 'top' scores in various density measures in the Netherlands (e.g. Dekker 2004 151) . This is so because, in contrast to for instance the United Kingdom, all Dutch schools and health care institutions are included as non-profit organization as they are relatively independent from government (Burger et al. 1997) . It is not clear how this helps answering relevant research questions because in functional or behavioral terms Dutch schools or hospitals are not different from British ones.
One of the achievements of the research network is that the United Nations adopted their definition as a guideline for national statistical offices (United Nations 2003) . This allows the network to rely on aggregate data collected by national statistical offices in various countries on the number of non-profit organizations, their turn-over, their staff and so on. A first wave of publications on several Western European countries occurred in the mid-nineties (Anheier& Seibel 2001 , e.g.Archambault 1997 , Kendall& Knapp 1996 and the project expanded in term of countries and depth over the past decade or so (Salamon& Sokolowski 1999 , Salamon& Sokolowski 2004 .
As regards theory, Salamon and Anheier (1998) propose a 'social origins' theory of nonprofit activity. They postulate that social forces such as religious diversity and income per capita drive the establishment of nonprofit organizations and these factors are mediated through four distinct third-sector regimes (statist, liberal, social-democratic and corporatist) . In terms of the indicators used, there are some similarities to population ecological models of density and diversity. Such models have, however, never been explicitly employed to explain nonprofit density or diversity (See review of studies of nonprofit density in: Lecy& Van Slyke 2013).
Adjacent to the study of national nonprofit density, are studies on the variation in sub-national numbers of voluntary organizations. The focus at the very low, geographical level, such as neighborhoods, makes it possible to include several explanatory factors that are otherwise difficult to precisely link to density numbers such as income levels, government subsidies and so on (Clifford 2012 , e.g.Clifford, Geyne-Rahme & Mohan 2013 , Mohan 2011 . These UK studies are interested in measuring social capital or the associational development as a welfare policy tool. The locally precise, high-n data is, however, very well suited for the assessment of population ecological theory.
Wollebaek (2009, 2010) shares this interest in social welfare policies but, in contrast the UK studies, theoretically relies on the organizational ecology tradition in among others social movement studies (Minkoff 1997) . He is interested in the change in density and the turn-over / volatility of local populations of voluntary associations. Social capital students, most notably Putnam (1995) , view associational volatility as indicators of social decline and disruption.
Wollebaek (2010 145) highlights that it matters when organizational volatility occurs in the context of aggregate population growth, stability or decline. To address this and as illustrated in Table 2 , he differentiates between, shrinking, stagnant, dynamic and expanding organizational populations. The relationship between volatility (or turn-over) and growth is also one of the main interests in some of the mapping exercises mentioned below on the UK and the EU (were stability masks underlying dynamism). Concerning the research at hand this means that, on the one hand, in cases where local communities experience a decline in the aggregate number of voluntary associations and high volatility, one may be pessimistic about the welfare functions provided by these organizations whereas, on the other hand, volatility in the context of aggregate growth is probably an indicator of social dynamism and renewal . This is a reminder that for probably a broad range of research questions it is insufficient to solely focus on aggregate numbers irrespective of turn-over. Another contribution is
Wollebaek's specification of the effect of demographic changes on voluntary associations. He departs from the assumption that 'humans are the main resource for the small-scale, amateurrun associations' in his study, and includes the number of persons, demographical 'turn-over' due to migration and the physical distribution of people per locality. He shows that such changes indeed affect the (change in the) density of associations but not in a detrimental way as expected by some social capital students. In broader terms, this suggests that the 'supply' or 'area' term in population models requires a more complex specification than a 'simple' aggregate number of potential constituents or indicator thereof. To conclude, these studies of voluntary non-profit organizations merit attention from those interested in population ecology. The elaborate data sets potentially provide for the statistical leverage to assess various explanatory factors at, especially, low geographical levels.
Furthermore, the specification of the 'area' or 'supply' term for 'social' sectors is surely more sophisticated than 'simple' public preferences but also include various socio-structural factors.
A second, longer running, distinctively European, partially neo-corporatist, research tradition focusses on business interest associations (Grant 2002 , Grote, Lang & Schneider 2008 , Schmitter& Streeck 1985 (Grant 2002) . Their central research interest is in the organizational management of the tension between the logic of influence and the logic of membership (Coleman& Grant 1988 , Schmitter& Streeck 1985 . In their view, the differences in density and diversity of associational systems in economic sectors and countries depends on the organizational capacities to manage the aggregation of interests (logic of membership) and the articulation of interest in the policy process (logic of influence). This means that, among others, the numbers of associations per country or sector are commonly related, as both cause and consequence, to the proportion of potential constituents, internal organizational structures and economic growth or political-economic structures.
Several researchers out of this research network continued with counting business associations in follow-up projects in the nineties (Crouch& Traxler 1995 , Traxler 2000 , Unger& Waarden 1999 . This broadened the research approach and community to industrial organization more broadly, consequently including counts of both business associations and labour unions (Ebbinghaus& Visser 1999 , Visser 2006 ). The associated interest in macro-economic policies also produced a research interest in the organizational adaptation of associations to Europeanisation and globalization (Grote, Lang & Schneider 2008 , Wilts 2001 ) and beyond the network of researchers associated with the OBI project (e.g. Eising 2009 ). Let's look into two studies of such studies that have an organizational ecological component.
To start, van Waarden studies (1999, 1992a, 1992b) 1994 , Coleman 1988 ). This supports the notion that there is some sort of natural limit in the number of interest organisations (at a certain 'saturation point') that can exists in a certain socio-economic resource environment (which van Waarden labels: 'push factors'). This finding contradicts Olson's (1982 38-41) idea that stable societies accumulate increasing numbers of interest organizations. Van Waarden (1992, 541) also points to changes in the policy or institutional environment of business associations (or (governmental) 'pull factors' as he calls them). That is, pre-world war two government policies 'were often highly branch- Their ecological approach balances the common organization theoretical dichotomy between organizational adaptation and selection. That is, on the one hand, they explicitly include 'environmental limitations' to the organizational room for maneuver, in the broader social, economic and technological environment of business associations (2003 231). On the other hand, they assume that these organisations 'have a choice of many different strategies of action to overcome their situations of uncertainty caused by resource-dependencies and institutional requirements' (2003 235) . This theoretical flexibility makes it possible to study both typical corporatist associational arrangements (in their case in the German chemical industry) and a dynamic, more competitive environment (representatives of IT-companies).
They find that, in the chemical industry, organizational adaptation to mainly economic changes occurs through change in the internal relationships between the federation and the sub-sector associations. Whereas in the IT sector, economic and technological change produce One of the main contributions of Vermeulen (2013) The key contribution is that, at least for these types of 'new' organizational formats within specific movements, specialization by tactic is probably very common. The organisations under study initially benefit the activities of similar groups as the issue and political tactics used become legitimated. After this initial phase and as predicted by organizational ecology opportunities but also needs to be approached carefully as it seems to contain non-EU active organization and misses some of the major PA firms (ALTER-EU 2013). When one accounts for this, this means that there are currently several ways to produce general counts of interest organisations in the EU. However, all of these data sources provide snapshots in time,
whereas some of the most interesting research questions require time-series. The data issues are not unique to the EU and the lack of overlap among sub-populations points at the importance of mixing or careful selective sampling of organizations.
As regards the descriptive work, Berkhout and Lowery (Berkhout& Lowery 2010, Berkhout& Lowery 2011) provide both a long-term as a medium-term analysis. As regards the longer term, they show that there has not been an 'explosion' of lobbyists in Brussels. The number of lobbyists grew in the early nineties but remained more or less constant from the mid-nineties onwards (Berkhout& Lowery 2010). This is in spite of the substantial differentiation of policies the EU and its eastern enlargement. Some of this may be captured by the growing diversity of interests represented, with a notable increased share of 'public' interests present.
Berkhout and Lowery (2011) There are a couple of recent studies that seek to explain the density differences sectors within the general EU interest population. Some researchers, such as Lowery and co-authors, takes an explicit population ecological approach, whereas others, such as Coen and several coauthors, tends to take a relatively EU-specific and more inductive approach. Broscheid and Coen (2007) seek to explain the differences numbers of interest organizations between However, the precise causal order and mechanism is not fully specified because Coen and Katsaitis use an indirect and general measure of the link between DG's and groups, and of 'informational demands' (staff, nature of policy, DG age). Further, generalization beyond the EU case is hampered because of the use of the DG subdivision rather than a more generally used and conceptually embedded policy classification such as the policy agendas code scheme (www.policyagendas.org).
By making use of online consultations that have a distinctively narrower policy focus than DG's, Rasmussen and co-authors are able to better specify the policy interest of interest organisations and the associated group densities of the 142 consultation studied (Rasmussen, Carroll & Lowery 2013 . descriptively compare the population of consultation participants with the Register of Interest
Representatives and seek to explain the level of business interest participation in policy consultations. Similar to various other researchers (e.g. Wonka et al. 2010 467) , they find 'very obvious' aggregate business dominance, with even stronger dominance in consultations than in the register. This suggests that business interests are not only more numerous but also more active. Somewhat similar to Coen and his co-authors, they expect and find that 'demand' generated in the policy process shapes the numbers and types of interests represented. This 'demand' is broader than political-administrative informational needs, central for Coen, and also includes the conflict structure of the policy area. They differentiate administrative, regulatory and expenditure proposals, and classify policies in terms of the concentrated or diffuse cost distribution for those affected. They find that regulatory proposals in which the costs are concentrated lead to a 'biased' pro-business mobilization of interests.
Of course, in the absence of an agreed reference point consisting of the 'actual' distribution of interests in society or on specific policies, this does not answer the normative question how a 'unbiased' participation of groups would look like, nor whether policy outcomes are actually biased.
In addition to some of the demand-factors mentioned, include several supply-factors to explain the density of interest associations in same 142 EU consultations.
Most importantly, they include data on the relative importance the public attaches to certain policies and interest guild density measure from the Register of Interest Representatives. They find that 'more interest organization mobilize on issues with consequences for public budgets and that fall within policy areas regarded as important by the public' (2013 16 relationship in which interest organizational presence lags, leads or is contemporaneous with legislative activity. Their interpretation of this is that a general theory, here differentiated as pluralist, corporatist or transactionalist theory, of this relationship is too shallow and that a more circumstantial or contingent theory, while more challenging to construct, is better suited.
Such a theory then should include various aspects of the legislative proposal at hand and various characteristics of the interest guild involved.
Also studying the EU group population, Messer et al (2010) and Berkhout et al (2013) seek to explain variation in interest group density between economic sectors. By relying on economic sectors rather than DG's of the European Commission, consultative issues or legislative fields, they are definitively closer to the members-resources dimension of the selective environment of interest organization than the other studies mentioned above. This increases the theoretical and empirical plausibility that ecological phenomena, most notably density dependence, occur. It also provides substantial number of cases which gives the statistical leverage needed to assess several potential explanations. However, this also necessitates the researchers to empirically link the 'energy' in the policy areas to interest organizations mobilized through the 'area' resources in economic sectors. This can only be done in an imperfect manner. The focus on economic sectors also leads to the exclusion of the substantial, 'social' or 'public' part of the EU group population (but note the relatively unsuccessful inclusion of such sectors in Messer et al (2010) ). Messer et al (2010) explicitly import the population ecological Energy-Stability-Area model from the US. They show that the most important components of the model such as the 'valued added' (or turnover) per sector predicts, as in the US case, the number of interest organizations per sector present in the EU. Berkhout et al (2013) use a more precise measures and a somewhat broader range of independent variables than Messer et al. (2010) . They also use a model specification that allows for the cross-sectoral assessment of time-dependent density dependence by interacting all explanatory variables on number of potential constituents.
The main contribution of these EU-focused articles is that they show that, with some adaptation, population ecological models can travel across different political systems. They also provide some innovative attempts to address the challenges that arise from the different dimensions along which interest organizations compete and the associated linking of policy- Among several of such findings, Halpin (2011) , as Baumgartner and Leech (2001) , finds substantial 'bandwagons' of interest organizations jointly and simultaneously focusing their policy interests on certain issues while disregarding others. Extending Baumgartner and
Leech's work, he also points to the several cue-givers (media, civil service, campaign groups) who are potentially responsible for the cascades of interest group attention to some issues. He specifically highlights the strategic choice on the part of federations to mobilize (or not) their constituents. That is, federations may mobilise their constituent member associations into lobby campaigns, consequently producing a 'bandwagon' effect on a certain issue. However, Halpin (2011, 221-2) points out that umbrella groups may also 'absorb' the activity of affiliate groups by taking sole representational responsibility. These dynamics are somewhat similar as those highlighted by the students of business interest associations discussed in the previous section.
Consistent with population ecological research, Halpin and Thomas (2012) find that groups compete for members rather than policy attention. Such competition produces anxiety among groups about their survival, especially, and this is a contribution, when past organizational change has been unsuccessful. Halpin, Baxter and MacLeod (2011) highlight the lack of overlap between group populations active in executive politics (consultation, direct contact), legislative politics and media politics. Among other things, this implies that there is a clear hierarchy between an 'ever-presently engaged policy-dedicated core and an ephemerally engaged amateur periphery' (2011 136), as also found in abovementioned research on the EU case. It also indicates that 'multiple lenses seem a sensible strategy' when selecting data sources for the construction of interest group populations.
In the Netherlands, Braun-Poppelaars has pioneered the general mapping of interest organizations (Poppelaars 2009 (Christiansen et al. 2010 , Christiansen 2011 in her assessment of survival in the Danish interest population from the mid-Seventies onwards (Fisker 2013) , and her evaluation of the density dependence of Danish patient groups from the early twentieth century onwards (Fisker 2013) . In Sweden, Naurin and Borang (2012) have collected interest group data on the basis of registers of senders of letters to strategically selected ministries.
This provides them with a long time-series and some information of actual policy interest of interest organizations. In Germany, as mentioned earlier, Klüver (2012) 
Discussion and conclusion
I conclude with an assessment of specific empirical and theoretical challenges in various strands in the literature, similarities and differences in research outcomes, and venues for further research.
First, a challenge for descriptive projects is the choice (if any) of data source. As the EU and Scottish cases show, there are distinct differences in the types of groups present in different arenas or associated with the different original aims of any directory, list or register. This complicates the comparison of research outcomes of surveys relying on different sources within a single system, and country-comparisons in which non-equivalent sources are used.
The mixing of data sources, as recommended by several of the authors discussed, partially addresses this issue.
Second, a common challenge in the construction of explanatory frameworks is the valid connection between independent variables and the dependent variable when these are not observed at the same level. That is, interest organizations compete for organizational resources from multiple environments, most importantly the policy and constituent environment, and these cannot be captured using a single classification scheme to which all relevant variables can be connected. The current approach of linking, of for instance public opinion issues to consultation issues, is consequently imperfect but the best available.
A couple of things are noteworthy as regards the similarities and differences in research findings. First, in several cases scholars report different mechanisms that mediate between actual changes in the resource environment (e.g. economic growth, policy change) and the expected effect on the density of interest organizations. On of such mechanisms is the 'Bandwagon'-effect according to which interest organizations take cues from others in focusing their attention to certain policy changes rather than others. This implies that the mobilizing effect of policy change (a 'disturbance' in the Trumanian sense) is mediated by the presence of cue-givers such as the media or colleague-interest organizations (e.g. Halpin 2011). Another mechanism noted is the organizational capacity of centrally-networked associations or federations. Such organizations in some case absorb the 'supply' (or 'area') of organizational resources in a certain guild. As shown by Grote and Lang (2003) , this is the case for interest representation of the German chemical industry. Here, economic and policy changes over the past decades did not affect the density of interest organizations. point to a similar phenomenon in their evaluation of the decline of trade associations in the United Kingdom. In other cases, and probably also dependent on the nature of the 'energy' in the policy process, business association cannot fully 'channel' the lobby activities of the their company-members, and these members choose to lobby on their own (with associated effects on the density and diversity of pressure participants).
Second, a consistent finding in the UK and EU studies that cover longer time periods is that aggregate numbers of organizations potentially mask underlying turnover of organizations.
This turnover shapes the diversity, for instance in the UK case affecting the relative proportion of professional vis-à-vis trade associations, and determines the age-composition and associated distribution of lobby experience within populations. In the UK and Norwegian case, researchers have suggested that the turnover is explained by supply-side changes on the part of constituents such as economic specialization and local migration. In the EU case, it seems more plausible that demand-side system characteristics, i.e. EU's multilevel nature, is conductive to high turnover. This requires further study, as no study has systematically assessed the determinants of turn-over in interest guilds or populations (nor its precise implications).
As regards future research, the main trend seems to be in the direction of relatively large datasets that include multiple countries, is cross-sectoral, over a long time period, at different geographical levels and in multiple arena's using a behavioral definition of interest organizations. Through the combination of datasets from different projects, for instance at the EU and national level, such complex data on the numbers and types of organizations is within reach. However, besides the various empirical challenges regarding the explanatory variables, the theoretical development of a well-specified model is theoretical very demanding. That is, as highlighted by Lowery et al (2008) , such comparative, multi-level, time-series models introduce a lot of variation in the nature of the relationships that appear relatively 'simple' in standard versions of population ecological models. For instance, the effect of demand-side factors such as policy conflict potentially varies strongly between political systems, depending on, among other factors, the relationship between political parties and interest groups. In some countries, political conflict may have a strongly mobilizing effect on interest organizations due to their affiliation with parties, whereas in other countries such mobilization is strategically unfavorable because groups may want to cherish long-term relationships with bureaucrats in policy networks. The great difficulty to isolate the 'group-system' from other components of the political system, and to isolate population dynamics from other aspects of interest representation, lead Lowery et al (2008 Lowery et al ( , 1245 to be 'somewhat pessimistic' about complex comparative theory formation on interest representation and see only room for 'careful, narrow comparison across relatively similar systems'. The main challenge is to design population ecological research in such narrow fashion that it retains its theoretical validity but broad enough to include variation on several demand-, supply-and mediating factors, possibly at multiple levels of observation.
